feat(auth): Implement secure httpOnly cookie authentication for Okta#1920
feat(auth): Implement secure httpOnly cookie authentication for Okta#1920arjunp99 wants to merge 11 commits intodata-dot-all:mainfrom
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Replace localStorage token storage with httpOnly cookies to prevent XSS attacks. Implements custom PKCE flow for Okta authentication while maintaining existing Cognito/Amplify behavior unchanged. Changes: - Add PKCE utility for secure OAuth code exchange - Add Callback view for handling OAuth redirects - Add backend auth_handler for token exchange endpoints - Update GenericAuthContext with cookie-based auth for Okta - Update useClient to work without Authorization header for Okta - Configure CloudFront to proxy /auth/*, /graphql/*, /search/* paths - Update Lambda API with auth endpoints and CORS for cookies - Update custom authorizer to read tokens from Cookie header Security improvements: - Tokens stored in httpOnly cookies (not accessible via JavaScript) - SameSite=Lax prevents CSRF while allowing OAuth redirects - Secure flag ensures HTTPS-only transmission
Security improvements: - Add structured logging with sanitized error messages - Remove hardcoded CloudFront URL fallback (requires proper config) - Move SimpleCookie import to module level for better performance Frontend enhancements: - Add 30-second timeout to token exchange requests - Fix useEffect dependency array in useClient hook - Implement OAuth callback handler with PKCE validation Infrastructure updates: - Configure auth handler Lambda for cookie-based authentication - Add API Gateway routes for token exchange, logout, and userinfo - Improve CloudFront URL parsing documentation All changes pass Ruff linting and formatting checks.
| def logout_handler(event): | ||
| """Clear all auth cookies""" | ||
| cookies = [] | ||
| for cookie_name in ['access_token', 'id_token', 'refresh_token']: |
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Should we also logout from okta. Here we are deleting those cookies but that doesn't mean we will be logging out of Okta. Should we make a call to the okta endpoint to let Okta know that we want to logout ?
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Yes, good point! I'll implement Okta logout by redirecting to Okta's /v1/logout endpoint from the frontend after clearing cookies. This fully ends the Okta session so the user must re-authenticate on next login.
The flow will be:
Frontend calls /auth/logout to clear cookies
Frontend redirects to {okta_url}/v1/logout?id_token_hint=...&post_logout_redirect_uri=...
This is handled on the frontend side since it requires a browser redirect.
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Super nit: can you comment this flow as a comment here so that anyone looking at this will have clear reference
TejasRGitHub
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Hey @arjunp99 , The changes made by you look very solid. I have added comments some of which are for clarification and some cosmetic. But mostly everything looks solid
There are a few things which I think are missing,
- What happens when the user token expires, in the current implementation, the webapp automatically resets to the login page. There is an internal event set when the token reaches expiration. I think if possible we should mimick that.
- The logout flow currently only clears the cookies but it should also logout from okta if such an endpoint is present to invalid the tokens in okta at the same time user logouts
## Changes ### Backend (auth_handler.py) - Add binascii import for proper base64 decoding error handling - Improve 404 error message to list valid auth endpoints - Add CLOUDFRONT_URL validation with debug logging - Add detailed comments explaining JWT payload decoding logic - Add specific exception handling for JWT decode errors (binascii.Error, ValueError, JSONDecodeError) - Separate generic exceptions from token-specific errors for better debugging ### Infrastructure - deploy/stacks/cloudfront.py: Remove unnecessary backend_region check (custom_auth is sufficient) - deploy/stacks/lambda_api.py: Use PYTHON_LAMBDA_RUNTIME constant instead of hardcoded Python 3.12 - deploy/stacks/lambda_api.py: Add comment clarifying authorizer supports both cookie and Authorization header auth ### Frontend - frontend/src/authentication/contexts/GenericAuthContext.js: Import PKCE utils from centralized utils/index.js - frontend/src/utils/index.js: Export PKCE utilities for better code organization - frontend/src/index.js: Minor formatting cleanup ## Benefits - Better error messages for debugging authentication issues - Improved code maintainability with centralized imports - More robust JWT decoding with specific error handling - Clearer documentation for dual authentication support (cookies + headers)
- Backend logout_handler returns Okta logout URL with id_token_hint - Frontend redirects to Okta /v1/logout to end SSO session - Added cloudfront_url config fallback for CLOUDFRONT_URL env var
## Checkov Fixes (5 issues resolved) ### 1. CKV_AWS_158: CloudWatch Log Group KMS Encryption ✓ - Add dedicated KMS key (logs_kms_key) for CloudWatch Logs encryption - Configure key policy to allow CloudWatch Logs service access - Apply encryption to auth handler log group - Enable key rotation for compliance ### 2. CKV_AWS_115: Lambda Concurrent Execution Limit ✓ - Set reserved_concurrent_executions=100 for auth handler Lambda - Prevents runaway costs from unlimited concurrent executions - Provides predictable capacity planning - Protects against DDoS-style attacks ### 3-5. CKV_AWS_59: API Gateway Authorization ✓ - Add suppression comments for 3 auth endpoints: * /auth/token-exchange (POST) * /auth/logout (POST) * /auth/userinfo (GET) - These endpoints are intentionally public by design for OAuth flow - Protected by multiple security layers: * WAF rules (rate limiting, IP filtering) * CORS restrictions (only allowed origins) * Lambda-side validation (cookie/token validation) - OAuth callback endpoint must be publicly accessible - Logout must work with expired tokens - Userinfo validates cookies internally before returning data ## Security Posture - Auth handler logs now encrypted at rest with KMS (AES-256) - Key rotation enabled for compliance - Lambda concurrency limited to prevent cost overruns - Public auth endpoints documented and justified - Defense-in-depth approach maintained (WAF + CORS + Lambda validation) ## Impact - No breaking changes - All new resources properly secured - Passes all Checkov security scans for new code
| custom_waf_rules=None, | ||
| tooling_account_id=None, | ||
| backend_region=None, | ||
| custom_auth=None, |
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Pass this same via the cloudfront_stack . It's not gettign picked up and is None leading to no deployment of the behaviours
deploy/stacks/lambda_api.py
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| # Initialize Klayers | ||
| klayers = Klayers(self, python_version=PYTHON_LAMBDA_RUNTIME, region=self.region) | ||
| runtime = _lambda.Runtime.PYTHON_3_9 |
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Runtime is using incorrect version of python lamnda. instead should use PYTHON_LAMBDA_RUNTIME
- Fix ruff formatting in deploy/stacks/lambda_api.py - Replace hardcoded PYTHON_3_9 with PYTHON_LAMBDA_RUNTIME constant - Fix ESLint/Prettier errors in frontend (Callback.js, index.js, pkce.js) - Run npm audit fix for safe vulnerability patches
…erability Update serialize-javascript from 6.0.2 to ^7.0.3 to address GHSA-5c6j-r48x-rmvq (CVE-2020-7660 incomplete fix). The vulnerability allows RCE via RegExp.flags and Date.prototype.toISOString() when attacker controls input to serialize(). Changes: - Add serialize-javascript ^7.0.3 as direct dependency - Add top-level override for serialize-javascript - Add nested override for rollup-plugin-terser dependency - Add resolution for yarn compatibility - Regenerate lock files
Add auth API Gateway methods to checkov baseline. These endpoints intentionally have no API Gateway authorization because they are part of the OAuth authentication flow: - /auth/token-exchange - exchanges authorization code for tokens - /auth/logout - clears httpOnly cookies - /auth/userinfo - returns user info from validated cookies Security is enforced at the Lambda level through: - CORS restrictions to CloudFront domain - Cookie validation and Okta token verification - WAF rules (when configured) Also baseline the new AuthHandler Lambda function for standard Lambda checks (CKV_AWS_115, CKV_AWS_116, CKV_AWS_158).
…lity The latest react-apexcharts (1.4.x+) requires apexcharts>=4.0.0 which conflicts with the project's apexcharts@^3.33.2. Pin to 1.3.9 which supports apexcharts@^3.18.0.
Summary
Replace localStorage token storage with httpOnly cookies to prevent XSS attacks for Okta authentication. This implements a custom PKCE flow while maintaining existing Cognito/Amplify behavior unchanged.
Security Improvements
Changes
Frontend
frontend/src/utils/pkce.js- PKCE utility for secure OAuth code exchangefrontend/src/authentication/views/Callback.js- OAuth callback handlerfrontend/src/authentication/contexts/GenericAuthContext.js- Cookie-based auth for Oktafrontend/src/services/hooks/useClient.js- Relative URLs + credentials for cookiesfrontend/src/routes.js- Added /callback routeBackend
backend/auth_handler.py- Token exchange, userinfo, logout endpointsdeploy/stacks/lambda_api.py- Auth handler Lambda + API routesdeploy/stacks/cloudfront.py- Proxy /auth/, /graphql/, /search/* to API Gatewaydeploy/custom_resources/custom_authorizer/custom_authorizer_lambda.py- Read tokens from Cookie headerHow It Works
Backward Compatibility