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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughAdds debug console logging to social binding signing and verification flows and removes push-token retrieval/display from the onboarding page; no public API changes or control-flow alterations beyond added logs and minor missing-registry handling. Changes
Estimated code review effort🎯 3 (Moderate) | ⏱️ ~20 minutes Possibly related PRs
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🚥 Pre-merge checks | ❌ 3❌ Failed checks (2 warnings, 1 inconclusive)
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Actionable comments posted: 4
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
Inline comments:
In `@infrastructure/eid-wallet/src/lib/utils/socialBinding.ts`:
- Around line 307-315: The console.log in createSocialConnectionDoc currently
prints sensitive fields (normalizedSubject, normalizedSigner, subjectName,
parties, relationDescription and a fragment of signatureHash); remove this
detailed log and replace it with a fully redacted diagnostic (e.g., log only an
operation identifier, the count of parties, and a redaction marker) so no PII or
signature material is emitted; ensure any remaining log references only
non-sensitive metadata (e.g., parties.length, "social-binding created attempt",
and a hashed or fixed redaction token) and do not include signatureHash or
subjectName.
In `@infrastructure/eid-wallet/src/routes/`(app)/scan-qr/scanLogic.ts:
- Around line 730-748: The debug logs in the social-binding flow leak sensitive
social-graph fields (doc, canonicalPayload/payload, signerEname, requesterEname,
requesterName, relationDescription) and also expose a signature preview from
sig; modify the code around globalState.walletSdkAdapter.signPayload to remove
these detailed console.log calls and instead either (a) completely drop logging
in production, or (b) guard minimal redacted logging behind a debug flag (e.g.,
only log non-sensitive counters or lengths such as payloadLength and
signatureLength) so no names, parties, relation text, or signature fragments are
printed; update/remove the two console.log blocks that reference doc, payload,
signerEname, requesterName, relationDescription, and sig accordingly.
In `@infrastructure/evault-core/src/services/BindingDocumentService.ts`:
- Around line 130-133: The code in BindingDocumentService.verifyUserSignature
currently returns false when this.registryUrl is missing, which masks
configuration errors as signature failures; change this to throw a clear error
(e.g., new Error or a custom Error) when this.registryUrl is not set so the
GraphQL layer surfaces the configuration problem. Locate the verifyUserSignature
method and replace the early return false branch that checks this.registryUrl
with a thrown error message indicating the missing registryUrl/configuration.
- Around line 136-151: The console logs in verifyUserSignature (and the similar
block at lines 235-260) expose sensitive values—signature, payload excerpts,
signer, and expectedHash—so remove or redact them; replace the detailed
console.log calls around verifyUserSignature and any other logging that prints
payload/signature with metadata-only messages (e.g., log function name,
registryBaseUrl, lengths or presence flags, and a redacted boolean like
hasSignature) and never emit actual signature, expectedHash, payload contents,
or social_connection fields (relation_description, names); ensure
verifySignature calls remain unchanged but only log the safe metadata and the
final validity result.
ℹ️ Review info
⚙️ Run configuration
Configuration used: defaults
Review profile: CHILL
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Run ID: 64d85578-f81f-457a-894a-ec6176226f4d
⛔ Files ignored due to path filters (1)
infrastructure/eid-wallet/src-tauri/gen/android/key-shitore.propertiesis excluded by!**/gen/**
📒 Files selected for processing (4)
infrastructure/eid-wallet/src/lib/utils/socialBinding.tsinfrastructure/eid-wallet/src/routes/(app)/scan-qr/scanLogic.tsinfrastructure/eid-wallet/src/routes/(auth)/onboarding/+page.svelteinfrastructure/evault-core/src/services/BindingDocumentService.ts
💤 Files with no reviewable changes (1)
- infrastructure/eid-wallet/src/routes/(auth)/onboarding/+page.svelte
Summary
pushToken,pushTokenLoading,pushTokenErrorvariables andNotificationServiceimport from onboardingTest plan
pnpm build)Summary by CodeRabbit
Bug Fixes
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